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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 MCI Telecommunications ("MCI"), a long distance 
telecommunications service provider, has sued Teleconcepts to 
recover the cost of services MCI provided under MCI's Federal 
Communications Commission tariff ("FCC tariff").  Teleconcepts 
raised the untimely service of the complaint and the statute of 
limitations as defenses, and also brought a third-party action 
against Bell of Pennsylvania ("Bell"), Teleconcepts' local 
telephone exchange carrier.  Bell disclaimed liability under the 
terms of its Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Tariff ("PUC 
Tariff").  The district court held that the action was not time-
barred and that "good cause" existed for the late service of the 
complaint.  The court also granted summary judgment to both MCI 
3 
and Bell holding that the FCC and PUC tariffs both placed the 
responsibility for unauthorized telephone calls on Teleconcepts. 
 Because we find that MCI's action was partially barred by 
the statute of limitations, and that the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction required the district court to transfer the third-
party complaint to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, we 
will reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND          
 Teleconcepts owns coin operated telephones - commonly 
referred to as "pay phones" - that it places on the premises of 
various businesses.  MCI supplied long distance telephone service 
to Teleconcepts from January 1988 through March 1990 under the 
terms and conditions of the tariff MCI had filed with the Federal 
Communications Commission.  When Teleconcepts' pay phones are 
used, Teleconcepts incurs a cost to Bell of Pennsylvania for the 
use of Bell's telephone lines.  The monthly bill for the line 
charges also includes the customer's long distance charges for 
the preceding month.  Teleconcepts' November 1989 bills from MCI 
for long distance calls included long distance service charges 
for international telephone calls in excess of $7,000. 
Teleconcepts was billed under six different account numbers, 
which presumably represent six different Teleconcepts' pay 
phones.  The November charges exceeded prior months' long 
distance charges to such an extent that Teleconcepts was certain 
that a billing error had occurred, and so informed Bell. However, 
since Bell was merely a conduit for billing long distance 
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charges, it responded by telling Teleconcepts to contact its long 
distance carrier - MCI. 
 Teleconcepts contacted MCI and informed it of the numerous 
long distance calls to the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico 
that Teleconcepts believed had not been made from any of its 
phones and requested a credit.  When MCI refused, Teleconcepts 
told MCI that it would not pay for these long distance charges, 
but MCI continued to provide long distance service.  When 
Teleconcepts received its December bills it discovered over 
$13,000 in doubtful charges to Puerto Rico and the Dominican 
Republic.  Teleconcepts again refused to pay these charges.  
 On December 27, 1989, MCI notified Teleconcepts that its 
long distance service was terminated.  However, for some reason, 
MCI failed to terminate long distance service until the following 
March.  In the interim, Teleconcepts continued to receive bills 
containing exorbitant long distance charges, and Teleconcepts 
continued to refuse to pay.  Finally, MCI sued Teleconcepts to 
recover the amount of unpaid charges for long distance services 
MCI had provided to Teleconcepts through March 1990 - $47,565.84. 
 Eventually, Teleconcepts came to believe that the questioned 
telephone calls had resulted from a fraudulent process known as 
"hacking."0  This occurred when a person called an 800 number on 
                     
0
      It is unclear exactly when Teleconcepts first learned that 
it may have been a "hacking" victim.  In an affidavit filed in 
the district court, John Goida, president of Teleconcepts, states 
he learned generally of the fraudulent "hacking" process during 
an unrelated phone conversation with an employee in Bell's fraud 
division, and he deduced that this is what happened to his pay 
phones.        
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a pay phone and remained silent until the receiving party hung 
up. A second dial tone would then be given to the 800 caller who 
could then call anywhere he or she desired without placing any 
additional coins in the telephone.  
    On January 15, 1992, MCI filed its initial summons and 
complaint in an effort to collect the unpaid charges from 
Teleconcepts.  MCI attempted service through the Mercer County 
Sheriff's Department, but its initial attempt was unsuccessful. 
Service was eventually made on June 25, 1992.  Teleconcepts 
responded by filing a third-party complaint against Bell of 
Pennsylvania in which it alleged that Bell was responsible for 
the defect in the dial tone that allowed the illegal "hacking" 
and that Bell should therefore indemnify Teleconcepts for any 
liability it may have to MCI.0  Teleconcepts eventually moved to 
dismiss the complaint because MCI had failed to effect service of 
process within 120 days of filing of the complaint as required by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j).  In an order dated 
September 15, 1992, the district court denied Teleconcepts' 
motion to dismiss MCI's complaint finding that "good cause" 
excused the late service. 
 Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  Teleconcepts claimed that MCI's action was untimely 
since it was not filed within the two year statute of limitations 
contained in the Communications Act.  Teleconcepts argued that 
MCI's cause of action accrued either when it refused to pay the 
                     
0
      It appears that the defect in the dial tone has since been 
remedied.  
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November 1989 bills, or at the latest, on December 27, 1989, when 
MCI gave notice that Teleconcepts' long distance services were 
terminated.  MCI countered by arguing that its action was timely 
because Teleconcepts' services continued until March 1990 despite 
the December 27, 1989 disconnect notice.  MCI further argued that 
under a 30 day payment provision of its federal tariff, final 
payment of the bills would not become due until either April 
1990, or January 27, 1990, at the earliest even accepting 
Teleconcepts' position.  Thus, MCI claimed the operative date for 
commencing an action was either March or April of 1992, or at the 
earliest, January 27, 1992. 
 The district court denied Teleconcepts' motion for summary 
judgment in a memorandum opinion and order dated December 28, 
1993.  Additionally, the court held that MCI's federal tariff 
placed responsibility for unauthorized calls on Teleconcepts, and 
thus, granted MCI's cross-motion for summary judgment.  The court 
also granted MCI's request for attorney's fees and, in a separate 
memorandum opinion and order dated February 25, 1994, determined 
the reasonable amount of such fees to be $11,812.50.  The court 
also held that the PUC tariff placed responsibility for 
unauthorized calls on payphone owners, and therefore granted 
summary judgment in favor of Bell and against Teleconcepts in a 
memorandum and order entered on June 20, 1994. 
 On appeal, Teleconcepts challenges the district court's 
denial of its motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the 
complaint, the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the 
7 
statute of limitations defense, the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Bell, and the amount of the attorney's fee award. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to 
review the issues raised by Teleconcepts on appeal.  The notice 
of appeal reads as follows: 
Teleconcepts, Inc., defendant-third party 
plaintiff appeals to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit from an 
order of summary judgment disposing the 
remaining claims of the District Court for 
the District of New Jersey entered in this 
case June 20, 1994, in favor of third party 
defendant, Bell of Pennsylvania and December 
28, 1993 in favor of plaintiff, MCI 
Telecommunications, Inc.    
            
App. at 1. 
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides, in 
pertinent part, that a notice of appeal "must designate the 
judgment, order or part thereof appealed from . . . ."  Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(c).  If a party does not satisfy the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), then the appellate 
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the undesignated issues. 
United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Even though the notice of appeal does not mention the 
September 15, 1992 order (denying Teleconcepts' motion to 
dismiss) or the district court's February 25, 1994 memorandum and 
order (calculating MCI's award of reasonable attorney's fees), 
Teleconcepts challenges both of these decisions in its brief to 
this court.  MCI argues that we did not acquire jurisdiction over 
8 
these issues since these orders are neither directly nor 
indirectly referred to in the notice of appeal.  Appellee's brief 
at 6. 
 "Our jurisprudence liberally construes notices of appeals." 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Thus, we have held that it is proper to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over orders not specified in the notice of 
appeal if "`there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified order, the intention to appeal the unspecified order 
is apparent and the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a 
full opportunity to brief the issues.'"  Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 
975 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Williams v. Guzzardi, 
875 F.2d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1989)).  These factors are present here. 
 We have repeatedly held that "`since . . . only a final 
judgment or order is appealable, the appeal of a final judgment 
draws into question all prior non-final orders and rulings.'" 
Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 858 (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d Cir. 1977)). Teleconcepts 
could not appeal the September 15, 1992 order denying its motion 
to dismiss MCI's complaint until the district court filed the 
December 28, 1993 order of summary judgment in favor of MCI.  
Moreover, in disposing of the remaining issues, the December 28, 
1993 memorandum opinion refers to the district court's September 
15, 1992 order denying Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss.  Thus, 
the requisite connection is present. 
 Similarly, while the notice of appeal does not refer to the 
February 25, 1994 memorandum and order calculating MCI's award of 
9 
reasonable attorney's fees, an adequate connection exists between 
a specified order that designates the prevailing party for 
purposes of attorney's fees and an unspecified order that 
quantifies the attorney's fee award.  See Bernardsville Bd. of 
Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.2d 149, 156 n.10 (3d Cir. 1994).  Since the 
December 28, 1993 order specifically granted MCI's request for 
attorney's fees and merely directed MCI to file an affidavit of 
reasonable attorney's fees, there is an adequate connection 
between these two orders. 
   Moreover, MCI is not prejudiced as it had an opportunity to 
brief the disputed issues, and has done so.   See id. at 156 
n.10.  Accordingly, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review 
the September 15, 1992 order denying Teleconcepts' motion to 
dismiss and the February 25, 1994 memorandum and order 
calculating an award of attorney's fees.  
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 Before addressing the substantive issues raised by 
Teleconcepts we must determine if the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over MCI's action against Teleconcepts in the 
first place.  While neither the district court nor Teleconcepts 
ever raised this issue we have an obligation to do so sua sponte. 
See Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 
1980); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 MCI's action is based upon Teleconcepts' failure to pay MCI 
for long distance telephone service MCI provided under the terms 
and conditions set forth in MCI's FCC Tariff.  MCI alleges that 
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since it is required to collect the charges on the services 
specified in the tariff under § 203 of the Communications Act of 
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1982), subject matter jurisdiction exists 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, and the Communications Act of 
1934, 47 U.S.C. §151, et seq. (1982).0   
 While this circuit has never addressed whether the 
collection of unpaid charges for long distance telephone service 
under an FCC tariff "arises under" federal law (28 U.S.C. § 1331) 
or an act of Congress regulating commerce (28 U.S.C. § 1337) the 
majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have 
answered in the affirmative.  See Western Union Int'l, Inc. v. 
Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1995); MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Graham, 7 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1993); 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 
385 (8th Cir. 1992); Ivy Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).  But see MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Credit Builders of Am., Inc., 980 
F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1993), vacated,      U.S.     , 113 S.Ct. 
2925 (1993), prior opinion reinstated, 2 F.3d 103 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied,      U.S.     , 114 S.Ct. 472 (1993).  
 In Richman Bros. Records, Inc. v. U.S. Sprint Communications 
Co., 953 F.2d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1991), we held that the 
                     
0
      28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that "the district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."  28 U.S. 
C. § 1337(a) provides, in part, that "[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action of proceeding 
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or 
protecting trade and against restraints and monopolies . . . ."   
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district court had jurisdiction over Sprint's action under a 
tariff filed with the FCC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 
However, we did not question jurisdiction because there was 
diversity of citizenship and we would thus have had jurisdiction 
even if federal question jurisdiction failed.  See id.  Given the 
subsequent decisions of our sister circuits and the lack of 
diversity here, we now undertake this analysis.  
 Those courts of appeals that have held that subject matter 
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and/or 1337(a), 
reason that a claim for unpaid long distance charges "arises 
under" an act of Congress regulating commerce (the Communications 
Act) because the claim relies on tariffs that must be filed with 
the FCC.0  See Western Union, 41 F.3d at 1496; Graham, 7 F.3d at 
479; Garden State Inv., 981 F.2d at 388; Ivy Broadcasting, 391 
F.2d at 493-494.  The lone appellate court to hold otherwise 
reasons that the federal common law is appropriate in only a "few 
and restricted" circumstances and doubts that collection of a 
delinquent phone bill falls within these limited circumstances. 
See Credit Builders, 980 F.2d at 1022-23.   
   This specific issue was first addressed in Ivy Broadcasting 
Co., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., supra.  There, the district court 
sua sponte dismissed a suit against A.T. & T. that arose from 
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      Although some courts that have addressed this issue 
have relied upon § 1331 and others have relied upon § 1337, there 
is no difference in these two bases of subject matter 
jurisdiction for purposes of our present analysis.  See Medlin, 
620 F.2d at 962-963 ("The 'arising under' requirement of section 
1337 has been interpreted to be the same as that found in 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 . . . ."); Yancoskie v. Delaware River Port 
Authority, 528 F.2d 722, 725 (3d Cir. 1975) (same).  
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problems that had occurred during a transmission over A.T. & T.'s 
telephone wires.  The court reasoned that claims for negligence 
and breach of contract did not arise out of the Communications 
Act but were founded on tort and contract law, and that the 
counterclaim was merely an action for services rendered that also 
lacked a federal jurisdictional basis.  On appeal the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that since 
the complaint did not allege a specific violation of the 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 207 did not confer jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the broad scheme of federal 
regulation of communications carriers indicated a congressional 
intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law.  See 
Ivy Broadcasting, 391 F.2d at 490. 
   It seems to us that the congressional 
purpose can be achieved only if a uniform 
federal law governs as to the standards of 
service which the carrier must provide and as 
to the extent of liability for failure to 
comply with such standards. 
 
Id. at 491. 
 
 The court concluded that since federal law controlled, the 
suit "arose under" the laws of the United States as required by 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
The word 'laws' in § 1331 should be construed 
to include laws created by federal judicial 
decision as well as by congressional 
legislation.  The rational of the 1875 grant 
of federal question jurisdiction -- to insure 
the availability of a forum designed to 
minimize the danger of hostility toward, and 
specially suited to the vindication of, 
federally created rights -- is as applicable 
to judicially created rights as to rights 
created by statute. 
13 
 
Id. at 492. 
   
 The court also held that 28 U.S.C. § 1337 provided 
jurisdiction over the counterclaims.  
 The Communications Act of 1934 is an 'Act of 
Congress regulating commerce' within the 
meaning of [§ 1337.] Since we conclude that 
the counterclaims arise under the 
Communications Act insofar as they rely upon 
tariffs which the Act requires to be filed 
with the FCC, we hold that [§ 1337] gives the 
district court jurisdiction over so much of 
the counterclaims as relies upon such 
tariffs. 
 
Id. at 494 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  The court's 
analysis relied heavily upon an analogous inquiry of the Supreme 
Court under the Commerce Act in Louisville & N. R. v. Rice, 247 
U.S. 201, 202 (1918). 
 Several other courts have employed the reasoning of Ivy 
Broadcasting to hold that federal district courts have subject 
matter jurisdiction over actions for unpaid charges for services 
provided under an FCC tariff.  In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
Garden State Inv. Corp, supra, MCI sued to recover unpaid 
telecommunications charges, and the district court dismissed the 
complaint sua sponte because the complaint did not allege a 
specific violation of the Communications Act.  The court reasoned 
that there was no need for uniform federal common law governing 
claims to collect unpaid telecommunication service charges, and 
that there was therefore no basis for the exercise of subject 
matter jurisdiction.      
14 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
relied heavily upon Supreme Court decisions involving federal 
jurisdiction under the Commerce Act to reverse.  (i.e.  Thurston 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533 (1983) 
(per curiam)).0  See Garden State Inv., 981 F.2d at 387-88.  The 
court reasoned that: 
the district court failed to recognize that a 
claim arises under federal law when a right 
created by federal law is an essential 
element of the plaintiff's action.  The 
district court stated MCI's claim brought 
under an FCC tariff 'is simply a contract 
action seeking to recover payment for 
services rendered.'  The district court's 
characterization of MCI's claim overlooks the 
fact that federal tariffs are the law, not 
mere contracts.  Although a user's refusal to 
pay charges fixed by a tariff will often 
arise in the context of a broken contract, 
the carrier's claim for payment is 
necessarily based on the filed tariff.   
 
Id. at 387 (citations omitted). 
 
 In analogous circumstances, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's sua 
sponte dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction in MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Graham, supra.  The court held that 
MCI's ability to sue was based upon its FCC tariff, and therefore 
was rooted in federal law.  See Graham, 7 F.3d at 479-80.  As in 
Ivy Broadcasting, the court was persuaded by similarities between 
the Communications Act and the Commerce Act and was guided by 
                     
0
     
      In Thurston, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' argument that a carrier's action for payment of 
transportation services was a "simple contract collection 
action."  Garden State Investment, supra, at 387 (citing 
Thurston, 460 U.S. at 533) 
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Thurston, Rice and the analysis of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ivy Broadcasting.  "[I]t would 
be incongruous to impose a different jurisdictional rule under 
the Communications Act than under the Commerce Act."  Id. at 480. 
See also Western Union, 41 F.3d at 1496-97 (subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim for unpaid telecommunications service 
charges existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337).   
 Only MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Credit Builders of Am., 
Inc., supra, reached a contrary result.  There, a supplier of 
telecommunications services appealed the district court's 
determination that a suit to collect unpaid telecommunications 
charges lacked a jurisdictional basis.  On appeal, the plaintiff 
argued that the district court had independent federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over matters 
arising out of the Communications Act under 28 U.S.C. § 1337.   
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
began its analysis by noting that:  
the Supreme Court has stated that a case 
arises under federal law if 'it really and 
substantially involves a dispute or 
controversy respecting the validity, 
construction, or effect of such a law, upon 
the determination of which the result 
depends.' 
 
Credit Builders, 980 F.2d at 1022 (citations omitted). 
 The court was not persuaded by the reasoning of Ivy 
Broadcasting.  Instead, the court reasoned that:      
[a]s the Supreme Court has emphasized, the 
federal common law is appropriate in only a 
'few and restricted' circumstances. Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313, 101 S.Ct. 
1784, 1790, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981).  In Texas 
16 
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 641, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2067, 68 
L.Ed.2d 500 (1981), the Supreme Court went on 
to  state that 'absent some congressional 
authorization to formulate substantive rules 
of decision, federal common law exists only 
in such narrow areas as those concerned with 
the rights and obligations of the United 
States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States 
or our relations with foreign nations, and 
admiralty cases.' We do not believe that this 
case to collect a delinquent telephone bill 
falls within these limited instances. 
 
Id. at 1022-23.  The court held that for these same reasons §1337 
did not confer federal question jurisdiction, and that 
plaintiff's action for breach of contract or quantum meruit was a 
creature of state law. 
 We are not persuaded by the analysis in Credit Builders. 
MCI's action is based upon, and draws its life from, the tariff 
that MCI filed with the Federal Communications Commission.  The 
reasoning of Ivy Broadcasting, and the analogous cases decided 
under the Commerce Act, see Thurston and Rice, supra, persuade us 
that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over 
MCI's action, and Teleconcepts' counterclaim.  However, there are 
other jurisdictional problems with that counterclaim which we 
discuss in more detail below. 
 C. Late Service of the Complaint.  
 When the district court denied Teleconcepts' motion to 
dismiss for failure to timely serve the complaint, Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(j) read in pertinent part: 
Summons:  Time Limit for Service.  If a 
service of the summons and complaint is not 
made upon a defendant within 120 days after 
17 
the filing of the complaint and the party on 
whose behalf such service was required cannot 
show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period, the action shall be 
dismissed as to that defendant without 
prejudice upon the court's own initiative 
with notice to such party or upon motion. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j).0 
 
 The district court was thus required to dismiss MCI's action 
if process was not served within 120 days of the filing of the 
complaint unless MCI could show good cause for the delinquency. 
See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d 
Cir. 1995).   
 MCI filed its initial summons and complaint on January 15, 
1992.  The papers were returned unserved by the Mercer County 
Sheriff's Department marked "unable to locate, unknown at address 
given" on February 25, 1992.  MCI requested an alias summons on 
or about March 12, 1992, after it discovered another address for 
service.  The alias summons was returned on an "unknown date" and 
forwarded for service on or about May 29, 1992.  Service of 
process was eventually achieved at this alternate address on June 
25, 1992, well over a month after the 120 days prescribed by Rule 
4(j) had lapsed.  MCI never made a request for an extension of 
time.      
 The district court found that "good cause" excused the late 
service, and denied Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss the 
complaint.  Our review of the district court's finding of "good 
                     
0
     
      As of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and 
redesignated Rule 4(m).  We discuss the significance of this 
amendment infra.      
 
18 
cause" is for an abuse of discretion.  See Lovelace v. Acme 
Markets, Inc., 820 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
965, 108 S.Ct. 455 (1987);  Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 
238, 242 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 The district court did not articulate the factor(s) it 
believed constituted "good cause."  The court initially orally 
denied Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss during the following 
exchange in a telephone conference: 
THE COURT:  All right. Now, the defendant 
moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Rule 4(j), which provides for dismissal 
unless good cause be shown.  I would like to 
hear from the defendant before I rule. 
 
MR. REILLY:  Your Honor, after I received the 
response from the plaintiff regarding my 
client's address as 51 Everett Street in 
Princeton, he informed me that that's been 
his address. I understand that he may not 
have been there at the time when the Sheriff 
initially went out.  The problem I have with 
the argument is that they did serve him 
eventually at another -- at his residence.   
 
  THE COURT:  Yes. 
 
MR. REILLY:  And that was some four months 
after the initial issuance of the summons and 
complaint, which I still feel is an 
inordinate amount of time -- 
 
THE COURT:  Well, I've seen no prejudice. The 
remedy if good cause were not shown would be 
dismissal without prejudice and re-service.  
Under the circumstances, I certainly find 
good cause has been shown. Motion is denied.  
The defendant will answer, move or otherwise 
plead. 
 
 Subsequently, the district court memorialized this decision 
in the written order of September 15, 1992.  In that order, the 
19 
court stated merely that "good cause" had been shown and that the 
motion to dismiss was denied for the reasons set forth on the 
record.   
   Although the district court felt that Teleconcepts had not 
been prejudiced by the late service, absence of prejudice alone 
can never constitute good cause to excuse late service.  See 
United States v. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166-67 (D. Del. 1988) 
(courts have considered three factors in determining the 
existence of good cause: (1) reasonableness of plaintiff's 
efforts to serve (2) prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely 
service and (3) whether plaintiff moved for an enlargement of 
time to serve).  We have equated "good cause" with the concept of 
"excusable neglect" of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2), 
which requires "a demonstration of good faith on the part of the 
party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for 
noncompliance within the time specified in the rules."  See 
Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1312 (Becker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).0  Thus, while the prejudice may tip the 
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      Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b) provides in pertinent part: 
 
Enlargement.  When by these rules or by a 
notice given thereunder or by order of court 
an act is required or allowed to be done at 
or within a specified time, the court for 
cause shown may at any time in its discretion 
(1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is 
made before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed or as extended by a 
previous order, or (2) upon motion made after 
the expiration of the specified period permit 
the act to be dome where the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect . . . . 
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"good cause" scale, the primary focus is on the plaintiff's 
reasons for not complying with the time limit in the first place. 
Such "justifications" are conspicuously absent in the district 
court's oral decision and its subsequent written order. Moreover, 
the briefs to this court are silent on this issue and the parties 
have therefore not assisted in divining the "good cause" that the 
district court found.  In addition, our review of the entire 
record has uncovered only one reference to the "good cause" which 
the court may have felt supported late service.  In MCI's brief 
in opposition to Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss MCI states: 
 good cause is shown because service could 
not be made at the address given as the 
registered address for service of process at 
the time the complaint was filed.  It was 
necessary to make additional attempts at 
service by locating another address and 
requesting an alias summons. 
 
App. at 35. 
 Even if we were to speculate and conclude that this was the 
basis for the district court's finding of "good cause," we would 
have to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion.   
The summons was returned unserved on February 28, 1992.  MCI 
learned of Teleconcepts' alternative address as early as March 
12, 1992, and requested an alias summons on or about that same 
date.  Inexplicably, the summons was not forwarded for service 
until on or about May 29, 1992, and not served at this alternate 
address until June 25, 1992, well beyond the time limit 
prescribed by Rule 4(j).  MCI never moved for an extension of 
time. 
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 Nothing on this record explains why it took MCI over three 
months after it learned of Teleconcepts' alternate address to 
serve Teleconcepts.  Moreover, the record does not explain why 
MCI never filed a motion to enlarge the time to serve.  See 
Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 85 (alternative means of service and the 
ability to extend the time indicate a lack of diligence and weigh 
against a finding of good cause).  Since we are presented with no 
explanations as to what, if any, circumstances constitute 
sufficient "good cause" to excuse MCI's apparent lack of 
diligence, we hold that the district court abused its discretion 
in finding that good cause existed to excuse the late service. 
See Braxton, 817 F.2d at 242 (good cause does not exist when 
there is an "unexplained delinquency on the part of the process 
server and lack of oversight by counsel").   
 Reversal of a district court's finding that good cause 
existed to excuse late service results in the dismissal of an 
action, but such dismissal is without prejudice to the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the party can refile the complaint and receive a new 
120 day period to serve process.  See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1304 
n.6.   
 However, as of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and 
redesignated Rule 4(m).  Rule 4(m) provides, in part, that: 
If service of the summons and complaint is 
not made upon a defendant within 120 days 
after the filing of the complaint, the court, 
upon motion, or on its own initiative after 
notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the 
action without prejudice as to that defendant 
or direct that service be effectuated within 
a specified time; provided that if the 
plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 
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the court shall extend the time for service 
for an appropriate period. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 
 
 We recently addressed the significance of this amendment in 
Petrucelli v. Bohringer, supra.  There, we read Rule 4(m) "to 
require a court to extend time if good cause is shown and to 
allow a court discretion to dismiss or extend time absent a 
showing of good cause."  Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305.  Here the 
statute of limitations is in issue.  In Petrucelli, we emphasized 
that the expiration of the statute of limitations does not 
require the court to extend the time for service, as the court 
has discretion to dismiss the case even if the refiling of the 
action is barred.  See id. at 1306.  We also noted that Rule 4(m) 
should apply retroactively, to all matters pending at the time it 
became effective "insofar as just and practicable."  Id. at 1305 
(quoting The Order of the United States Supreme Court Adopting 
and Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 22, 
1993)).  Here, such retroactive application is both just and 
practicable as the district court has already made a 
determination that there is some basis to excuse MCI's lack of 
diligence.  As a result, the district court would have discretion 
to allow MCI's action to proceed upon remand under Rule 4(m) even 
though we have determined that no "good cause" was shown under 
Rule 4(j).  
 
[A]s a result of the rule change which led to Rule 
4(m), when entertaining a motion to extend time for 
service, the district court must proceed in the 
following manner.  First, the district court should 
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determine whether good cause exists for an extension of 
time.  If good cause is present, the district court 
must extend time for service and the inquiry is ended. 
If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may 
in its discretion decide whether to dismiss the case 
without prejudice or extend time for service. 
Id. at 1305.  Moreover, the expiration of the statute of 
limitations does not prohibit the district court from extending 
the time for service.  See id. at 1305-06.  
 The parties here apparently do not consider the substantive 
changes to Rule 4(j) significant to our analysis as neither has 
mentioned the amendment of Rule 4(j) or cited Petrucelli. 
However, we find Petrucelli's interpretation of the amendment to 
Rule 4(j) and its retroactive impact dispositive to the issues 
before us. 
 Accordingly, even though we have determined that the 
district court abused its discretion in inexplicably finding 
"good cause" for MCI's lack of diligence, the retroactive effect 
of Rule 4(m) means that the district court had the discretion to 
allow this action to proceed even in the absence of "good cause." 
We view the district court's decision to extend time as an 
exercise of its discretion under that Rule, and therefore, we 
affirm the district court's denial of Teleconcepts' motion to 
dismiss. 
             D. Statute of Limitations  
 Teleconcepts argues that the district court improperly 
denied its motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of 
limitations.  The Communications Act of 1934, provides that 
"[a]ll actions at law by carriers for recovery of their lawful 
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charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun, within two years 
from the time the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter." 
47 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1982).  The Act further states that a cause 
of action "in respect of the transmission of a message shall, for 
the purposes of this section, be deemed to accrue upon delivery . 
. . thereof by the carrier and not thereafter."  47 U.S.C. 
§415(e) (1982).  However, as noted above, MCI's FCC tariff 
provides that "MCI's bills are payable upon receipt.  Amounts not 
paid within 30 days after the date of the invoice will be 
considered past due . . . ." 
  In the district court, Teleconcepts argued that payment was 
due when it received the bills for long distance service in 
November 1989, and MCI's cause of action accrued when these bills 
went unpaid.  Teleconcepts also argued that, even if the "past 
due" standard were used, the cause of action accrued in December 
1989; and that the latest possible accrual date was December 27, 
1989, when MCI issued its letter terminating service.  Since 
MCI's action was filed more that two years from any of these 
potential accrual dates, Teleconcepts concludes that the action 
was untimely. 
 The district court rejected this position reasoning that 
"[i]n an action involving collection of accounts receivable, 
common sense dictates that in determining the tolling date of the 
applicable statute of limitations, this court must look to the 
date upon which payment was demanded and refused."  MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., No. 92-244, slip 
op. at 5 (D.N.J. December 28, 1993).  The court concluded that 
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MCI had until April 16, 1992 - two years after Teleconcepts 
failed to remit payment of its final invoice of March 17, 1990 -
to initiate this action.  Moreover, the court suggested that even 
if it were to focus on the December 27, 1989 termination letter, 
payment would not be due until January 26, 1990 (allowing for the 
30 day period contained in the tariff).  Since MCI filed the 
complaint on January 15, 1992, the court concluded it was timely 
and denied Teleconcepts' motion for summary judgment.  
 Our review of the district court's denial of Teleconcepts' 
summary judgment motion is plenary.  See Gulfstream II Assoc., 
Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 
1993); Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., 903 F.2d 243, 246 (3d Cir. 1990).  It is clear that our 
analysis is controlled by 47 U.S.C. § 415(a).  However, we must 
determine when a cause of action "accrues" for purposes of that 
statue.   
 In resolving this issue of first impression, Teleconcepts 
urges us to be guided by the numerous decisions that have 
construed the statute of limitations in the Commerce Act, see 49 
U.S.C. § 16(3) (repealed 1978)0, on which § 415 was based.  See 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 16 F.2d 760 
(4th Cir. 1927); South Omaha Terminal Ry. Co., Inc. v. Armour & 
Co., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 641, (D. Neb. 1974); Baker v. Chamberlain 
Mfg. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1314, (N.D. Ill. 1973).  In those cases 
                     
0
 In 1978, after the cases relied upon by Teleconcepts had been 
decided, 49 U.S.C. § 16(3) was repealed and replaced with 49 
U.S.C. § 11706. 
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the courts ruled that a carrier's action to recover charges 
accrues when delivery is made or tendered, irrespective of what 
occurs subsequent to delivery.  Teleconcepts reasons by analogy 
that MCI's cause of action accrued when it transmitted the long 
distance signals (i.e. "tendered delivery") in October 1989. 
Appellant's brief at 24. 
 We do not find this argument persuasive.  At the time the 
cases Teleconcepts relies upon were decided the Commerce Act 
provided that "[t]he cause of action in respect to a shipment of 
property shall, for purposes of this section, be deemed to accrue 
upon delivery or tender of delivery thereof by the carrier, and 
not after."  49 U.S.C. §16(3)(e) (repealed 1978).0  However, the 
Commerce Act is designed:  
to fix one date on which all causes of 
action, both those in favor of shipper and 
those in favor of carrier, with respect to 
any particular shipment, should be deemed to 
have accrued, so that, in the application of 
the section limiting time for suit, a 
situation would not arise wherein claims in 
favor of one party arising out of a 
particular shipment would be barred and those 
in favor of the other party not be barred. 
 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 16 F.2d at 761.   
 Although the explanation of "accrues" in § 415(e) is similar 
to that contained in the corresponding provision of the Commerce 
Act, those two provisions rest upon totally different policy 
considerations. 
                     
0
     
      "Accrual" is now defined in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(g) 
which states "[a] claim related to a shipment of property accrues 
under this section on delivery or tender of delivery by the 
carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 11706 (1982)   
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The [Commerce Act] is explicit that accrual under § 16(3)(e) is not 
synonymous or mutually interchangeable with collectability or dueness 
of the debt and that the point of delivery overrides any conventional 
notion of when an action judicially matures. . . . [C]ongress 
anticipated the multitude of variations in the period of limitations 
that would result if conventional standards of triggering the period 
were used and promulgated 16(3)(a) and (e) in order to avoid such 
variation by creating a uniform time of accrual irrespective of when 
the action could have generally been brought. 
 
South Omaha Terminal Ry. Co., 373 F. Supp. at 644.  Different considerations arise when 
the conflict is between a telecommunications company and its customer.  It would be 
nonsensical to conclude that a cause of action to collect charges for transmission of a 
telephone call accrues when a message is delivered.  Such a rule would allow a carrier to 
sue a customer as soon as the carrier completes a telephone connection even if the 
customer has not refused to pay, and even if the customer has given every indication that 
it would pay upon receipt of an accurate bill.  When a call is completed, the carrier has 
typically not even billed for the service, and the customer has every right to assume that 
it will not incur any liability so long as it pays the bill that is expected at some 
future time.  
 However, where a customer seeks redress from a telecommunications carrier based upon 
the improper transmission of a telecommunications signal, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the cause of action in favor of the customer does arise when the message is delivered 
or tendered.  It is then that the customer reasonably should know of the alleged problem.
See Central Scott Tel. Co. v. Teleconnect Long Distance Servs. & Sys. Co., 832 F. Supp. 
1317, 1320-21 (S.D. Iowa 1993)0 (the court relied upon the FCC's declaration that § 415(e) 
only "concerns a carrier's liability to its customers for failure to transm
accordance with its common carrier obligations").  See also Anchorage Tel. Util. v. 
Alascom, Inc., 4 FCC Rcd. 2472 (1989) ("Section 415(e) is concerned with a carrier's 
liability to its customer for failure to transmit a message . . ."); MCI 
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      Citing Williams Telecommunications Group, Inc. v. The Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Cos., 8 FCC Rcd. 1161, ¶ 16 n.35 (1993).  
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Telecommunications Corp. v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 5 F.C.C. Rcd. 3462 (1990) ("Section 415(e) 
is inapplicable to MCI's complaints. That Section concerns a carrier's liability to its 
customers . . .").   
 We agree that the limitations period contained in § 415(e) applies to actions brought 
by the carrier's customer that  allege a breach of a common carrier's obligation and not 
to an action against the customer.  Accordingly, here, the statute of limitations for 
purposes of § 415(a) accrues with "discovery of the right or wrong or of the facts on 
which such knowledge is chargeable in law."  Central Scott Tel. Co., 832 F. Supp. at 1320.  
MCI's tariff tells us when that occurred.  Under that tariff, "MCI's bills are payable 
upon receipt," however, "[a]mounts not paid within 30 days after the date of the invoice 
will be considered past due . . . ."  We must give these words their ordinary meaning.  
See Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964) 
(the words employed are given "their plain and ordinary meaning, except where the context 
in which they are used renders then a different denotation, or where legal or technical 
words are used and it is clear from their use that the legal or technical meaning was 
intended.").  Teleconcepts' obligations became past due 30 days after the date of a 
particular invoice.  It is therefore only then that MCI's cause of action under § 415(a) 
accrued, and it is at that point that the two year clock started ticking.  
 Moreover, Teleconcepts' duty (both under the tariff and as reflected by MCI's actual 
billing practice) is akin to an obligation to make installment payments.  "In an 
installment contract, a new cause of action arises from the date each payment is missed."  
Board of Trustees of the Dist. No. 15 Machinists' Pension Fund v. Kahle Eng. Corp.
F.3d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 951 (1951)).  
"[T]he statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due, 
that is, from the time when an action might be brought to recover it."  Id.
(quoting 51 Am.Jur.2d: Limitations of Actions § 133).  See also Metromedia Co. v. Hartz 
Mountain Assoc., 655 A.2d 1379, 1380-81 (N.J. 1995) (contract between lessee and lessor 
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whereby lessor was to reimburse lessee for lessee's use of an independent cleaning service 
treated like an installment contract and thus a new cause of action subject to its own 
limitations period accrued for each month that lessor failed to reimburse the lessee); 
Kiamichi Electric Cooperative v. Underwood, 842 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) 
(electric cooperative's contract to provide electricity was akin to installment contract 
and thus each monthly installment due constituted a new cause of action with its own 
statute of limitations).   
The period fixed by a statute of limitations begins to run from the 
'accrual of the cause of action.'  Since 'cause of action' is so 
uncertain and variable a concept, serious injustice may be done unless 
the court uses judicial discretion in applying such a statute in the 
case of 'partial' breaches of a single contract.  No doubt there is 
much authority for the statement that where separate actions would lie 
for a series of breaches, the statute operates against each one 
separately as of the time when each one could have been brought, and 
that this rule is not affected by the fact that after two or more such 
breaches have occurred the plaintiff must join them all in one cause 
of action.  Of course, if an action for a first instalment is barred 
by the statute, it can not be properly included in an action for later 
installments that are not yet barred. 
 
Corbin, supra, § 951, at 823-24.   
 Here, MCI first accrued a cause of action on December 8, 1989 -- 30 days after the 
date of the November 8, 1989 long distance bills.  Additional causes of action accrued 30 
days after the date of each of MCI's subsequent bills.  MCI could have instituted suit to 
recover payment on any one bill, or brought an action as they did to recover payment on 
all of them.  However, for MCI's action to have been timely as to all of the bills it must 
have been filed within two years of the date on which a cause of action accrued on each 
partial breach.  See Kahle Engineering Corp., 43 F.3d at 861 (action barred as to th
unpaid installments which came due prior to six year statute of limitations of the MPPAA); 
Metromedia, 655 A.2d at 1381; Corbin, supra, § 951, at 823-24.     
 Thus, MCI's action is untimely as to the amounts owed in the bills dated November 8, 
1989, November 15, 1989, and December 8, 1989.  MCI's cause of action for these bills 
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accrued on December 8, 1989, December 15, 1989 and January 8, 1990, respectively. Since 
the complaint was not filed until January 15, 1992, recovery for those bills is barred by 
the two year statute of limitations of § 415(a). 
 However, MCI's action is timely as to all subsequent bills. Accordingly, MCI can 
maintain its suit for amounts owing on the bills dated December 15, 1989;0 January 8, 
1990; January 9, 1990; February 8, 1990; March 8, 1990; and March 17, 1990.  
 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for the court 
to deduct from its judgment the amount of the bills dated November 8, 1989, November 15, 




 Teleconcepts challenges the award of attorney's fees arguing that hours expended by 
MCI's counsel were "clearly excessive," since there was no discovery and most of the work 
merely involved the preparation of pleadings.  See Appellant's brief at 32-
 The district court must exercise its informed discretion in awarding attorney's fees.  
See Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 
(1984). Thus, our standard of review is a narrow one.  "We can find an abuse of discretion 
if no reasonable [person] would adopt the district court's view.  If reasonable [people] 
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it canno
said that the trial court abused its discretion." Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). 
 The district court was familiar with the efforts of counsel, and conducted a careful 
review of the time that counsel spent working on this case.  The court found that the 
"actual hours claimed were in fact reasonably expended by counsel."  MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., No. 92-244, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. February 
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      Suit was instituted two years to the day from the date the cause of action accrued 
on this bill. 
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25, 1994).  Teleconcepts does not specify how the district court abused its discretion in 
its review, and we do not think that any such abuse of discretion occurred.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the award of attorney's fees. However, in view of our ruling on the statute of 
limitations, the district court should, upon remand, make whatever review of attorney's 
fees it feels warranted and adjust the prior award of fees if the court feels that such a 
reduction or adjustment is now appropriate.  We do not, however, take any position as to 
whether the court should make any such adjustment.  
F. Third-Party claim 
 Finally, Teleconcepts argues that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of third-party defendant, Bell.  Our review of this grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See Gulfstream II, 995 F.2d at 429. 
 Teleconcepts maintains it is entitled to be indemnified for any liability it owes to 
MCI because Bell allowed the fraudulent "hacking" to occur by furnishing a defective dial 
tone.  Teleconcepts' third-party complaint does not allege the basis for the district 
court's subject matter jurisdiction, nor does the district court state the basis of its 
jurisdiction.  However, since there was no independent basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction over that claim, we believe that the district court exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction based on the FCC tariff.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1993).0  
 Congress codified the judicially created doctrines of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction under the name "Supplemental Jurisdiction" at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Sec
embodies the jurisdictional standard established in United Mine Workers of America v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).  See Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, t
requirements must be satisfied before a federal court may exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction.  "The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter 
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      Diversity jurisdiction is clearly inapplicable since the amount in controversy does 
not exceed $50,000.  See 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1988).  
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jurisdiction on the court."  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.  The state and federal claim
derive from a common nucleus of operative facts, and the claims must be such that they 
would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.  See id.
F.3d at 760. 
 We believe that the third party complaint satisfies the prerequisites of § 1367(a).  
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, and 1337 confer subject matter jurisdiction over MCI's claim.  MCI's 
action and Teleconcepts' third-party action both arise out of the fraudulent "hacking" 
activity which purportedly resulted in exorbitant long distance charges.  Moreover, logic 
and prudent use of judicial resources dictate that these claims be tried in one judicial 
proceeding.  Accordingly, the third-party action meets the test for supplemental 
jurisdiction.   
 However, our inquiry does not end there.  Bell argues that the tariff it filed with 
the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission ("P.U.C.") places responsibility for 
unauthorized calls upon Teleconcepts.  That tariff provides in pertinent part: "The 
COCOT0. . . [s]ervice subscriber is considered as the Customer of Record and is 
responsible for all rates and charges associated with the service, . . . ."  Resolution of 
the third-party complaint therefore turns upon the interpretation and application of this 
PUC tariff.  We must therefore determine if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies.
Primary jurisdiction `applies where a claim is originally cognizable 
in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim 
requires resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have 
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.'  
In contrast, when the legislature provides an agency with 'exclusive 
primary jurisdiction,' it preempts the courts' original jurisdiction 
over the subject matter. 
 
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1230 n.5. (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).  If a legislature has vested an administrative agency with exclusive primary 
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parties agree that Teleconcepts is a COCOT within the meaning of that term in the PUC 
tariff. 
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jurisdiction, that agency is the only forum in which complaints within that jurisdiction 
may be brought.  Id. at 1230.  Even though the parties have not raised the doctrine of 
exclusive primary jurisdiction, we must determine if the third-party complaint should be 
heard by the PUC in the first instance.0  We are mindful of the fact that the concept of 
primary jurisdiction:  
is not simply a polite gesture of deference to the agency seeking an 
advisory opinion wherein the court is free to ignore the agency's 
determination.  Rather, once the court properly refers a matter or a 
specific issue to the agency, that agency's determination is binding 
upon the court and the parties (subject, of course, to appellate 
review through normal channels), and is not subject to collateral 
attack in the pending court proceeding. 
 
Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 420 A.2d 371, 376 (Pa. 1980) (footnotes omitted).  
1. The Statutory Framework of the PUC.  
 "The PUC has long been recognized as the appropriate forum for the adjudication of 
issues involving the reasonableness, adequacy and sufficiency of public utility services." 
Behrend v. Bell Telephone, 243 A.2d 346, 347 (Pa. 1968).   
 
The PUC has the power to 'prescribe as to service and facilities . . . 
just and reasonable standards. . . to be furnished, imposed, observed, 
and followed by any or all public utilities . . .' and upon finding, . 
. . 'that the service or facilities of any public utility are 
unreasonable, unsafe, inadequate, insufficient . . . ' the PUC 'shall 
determine and prescribe, by regulation or order, the reasonable, safe, 
adequate, sufficient, service or facilities to be observed, furnished, 
enforced or employed . . . ' 
 
 
Elkin v. Bell Telephone, 420 A.2d 371, 374 (Pa. 1980), see 66 P.S. §§ 1182, 1183, (1959) 
(repealed and replaced by 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 1504, 1505 (1978).  The Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Law requires public utilities to file tariffs with the PUC.  See 66 Pa. C.S.A. 66, 
§ 1302 (Purdon 1979 & Supp. 1995).  These tariffs are binding and dispositive of the 
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rights and liabilities between the customer and the public utility.  See 66 Pa. C.S.A. 66, 
§1303 (Purdon 1979).  The PUC has enforcement power over its tariffs and regulations, and 
matters that pertain to those tariffs are considered to be within the particular expertise 
of the PUC.  See 66 Pa. C.S.A. § 501, et. seq. (Purdon 1979). 
 Accordingly, "[t]he PUC has long been recognized as the appropriate forum for the 
adjudication of issues involving the reasonableness, adequacy and sufficiency of public 
utility services." Elkin, 420 A.2d at 374.  At oral argument, Teleconcepts conceded that 
it was challenging the reasonableness, adequacy and sufficiency of Bell's telephone 
service, and Bell admitted this point in its supplemental brief to this court.  
Supp. Brief at 1-2, 7.  Thus, it is not disputed that the subject matter of the third
party complaint is within the jurisdiction of the PUC, and that agency is the appropriate 
forum to resolve the issues raised by that complaint. That determination, however, though 
necessary to our analysis, is not sufficient to end our inquiry.  Our inquiry must then 
focus upon whether resolution of Teleconcepts' claim against Bell requires the special 
competence of the PUC.   
Courts should not be too hasty in referring a matter to an agency, or 
to develop a 'dependence' on the agencies whenever a controversy 
remotely involves some issue falling arguably within the domain of the 
agency's 'expertise.' 'Expertise' is no talisman dissolving a court's 
jurisdiction. Accommodation of the judicial and administrative 
functions does not mean abdication of judicial responsibility. . . .
   Therefore, where the subject matter is within an agency's 
jurisdiction and where it is a complex matter requiring special 
competence, with which the judge or jury would not or could not be 
familiar, the proper procedure is for the court to refer the matter to 
the appropriate agency. . . . Where, on the other hand, the matter is 
not one peculiarly within the agency's area of expertise, but is one 
which the courts or jury are equally well-suited to determine, the 
court must not abdicate its responsibility.  
 
Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377.   
2. The Need for the PUC's Expertise. 
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 As noted above, issues that implicate a utility's tariff are deemed to be within the 
special expertise of the PUC. In addition we are guided by Elkin, and DeFrancesco v. 
Western Pa. Water Co., 453 A.2d 595, 596 (Pa. 1982). In Elkin, the court held that 
allegations that Bell negligently failed to furnish the customer "reasonable rapid and 
efficient service" with respect to three wide-area telephone service ("WATS") lines, 
deliberately refused to furnish plaintiff with adequate directory assistance information 
service, and negligently failed to furnish written telephone numbers for prospective 
customers of plaintiff fell within the PUC's area of expertise.  Elkin, 420 A.2d. at 373, 
377.   
 By contrast, in DeFrancesco the court held that the allegation that fire damaged 
plaintiff's property because the city water company negligently failed to maintain proper 
water pressure did not fall within the PUC's expertise and thus its primary jurisd
The court reasoned:   
The controversy now before us . . . is not one in which the general 
reasonableness, adequacy or sufficiency of a public utility's service 
is drawn into question.  Resolution of appellant's claims depended 
upon no rule or regulation predicated on the peculiar expertise of the 
PUC, no agency policy, no question of service or facilities owed the 
general public, and no particular standard of safety or convenience 
articulated by the PUC.  . . .Rather, . . . . [r]esolving the 
essential question of whether the utility failed to perform its 
mandated duties requires no recondite knowledge or experience and 
falls within the scope of the ordinary business of our courts. 
 
 
DeFrancesco, 453 A.2d at 597.   
 Courts have routinely looked to Elkin and DeFrancesco to determine if a particular 
controversy implicated the special competence of the PUC.  See Optimum Image, Inc. v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 600 A.2d 553, 556-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (allegations that tariff was 
violated by the substandard and defective supply of electrical power brought controversy 
within the primary jurisdiction of the PUC); Ostrov v. I.F.T., Inc., 586 A.2d 409, 415 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (action did not come within the primary jurisdiction of PUC since 
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plaintiff did not contend that medical examination provision of self-insurance plan 
violated the PUC's rules or regulations governing self-insurance motor carriers nor any 
other PUC rule or regulation for self insurance)  Schriner v. Pa. Power & Light Co.
A.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing DeFrancesco the court held that problem 
of "stray voltage" depends upon "no rule or regulation predicated upon the peculiar 
expertise of the PUC . . ." and thus was not within the primary jurisdiction of the PUC); 
Morrow v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 479 A.2d 548, 551-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (plaintiff's 
challenge to public utility's rates relating to toll charges and its service practice 
regarding deposits held to be within the primary jurisdiction of the PUC).   
 Here, the dispute centers around Bell's performance under its tariff and any 
technical deficiencies that my have existed in the dial tone generated by its equipment.  
That complaint may rise or fall on the issue of the manner in which Bell complied with its 
obligation under its tariff to provide "reasonable, . . . efficient" service. The agency 
that can best determine Bell's compliance with that tariff is the PUC. In addition, 
Teleconcepts' allegation of deficient service transcends the present controversy and, at 
least potentially, calls into question the adequacy of Bell's service to the general 
public as Teleconcepts claims that the second dial tone was neither unique to Teleconcepts 
nor COCOT owners. We must therefore be sensitive to the need for uniformity and 
consistency in agency policy, which further suggests that the PUC decide the merits of 
Teleconcepts' claim initially.  See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377; Ostrov, 586 A.2d at 415 
("matters involving the general reasonableness or adequacy of a utility's service to the 
public are within the primary jurisdiction of the [PUC].").     
3. The Effect of the Relief Sought 
 Nevertheless, despite the need for the PUC to determine liability on Teleconcepts' 
third-party claim, the PUC is not empowered to award damages, and Teleconce
damages in the nature of indemnification. See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 374 ("the PUC has no 
authority to award damages").  However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has approved a 
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bifurcated procedure where, as here, a plaintiff sues a public utility based upon the 
latter's purported failure to provide adequate, reasonable or sufficient service, but 
seeks damages as a remedy.  See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 375-76; Ostrov, 586 A.2d at 414.  Under 
this bifurcated procedure, the issue of liability is transferred to, and initially decided 
by, the PUC.  If necessary, the appropriate trial court thereafter determines damages.  
See Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377; DeFrancesco, 453 A.2d at 596 n.3.   
 Accordingly, "the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the admin
agency cannot provide a means of complete redress to the complaining party and yet the 
dispute involves issues that are clearly better resolved in the first instance by the 
administrative agency charged with regulating the subject matter of the dispute."  
586 A.2d at 413.  The doctrine requires a court to transfer an issue that involves 
administrative expertise to the administrative agency charged with exercising that 
discretion.  Richman Bros., 953 F.2d at 1435 n.3.  "Essentially, the doctrine creates a 
workable relationship between the courts and administrative agencies wherein, in 
appropriate circumstances, the courts can have the benefit of the agency's views on issues 
within the agency's competence."  Elkin, 420 A.2d at 376.   
 In Optimum Image, supra, the plaintiff sued the Philadelphia Electric Company 
("PECO") alleging that the utility "wrongfully, negligently, carelessly and without 
reasonable cause delivered, over an extended period of time, unreasonably defective 
electrical power" to plaintiff's business premises.  The trial court transferred the 
determination of liability to the PUC.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. 
[Plaintiff alleges that] the electrical power supplied by PECO 
exceeded the ten percent variation allowed by PECO's tariff filed with 
the PUC.  In addition, [plaintiff] . . . alleges that the power with 
which it was supplied was substandard and outside the regulatory 
requirements and that the problem it experienced was not investigated 
with the proper equipment. 
                         . . . .  
In response, PECO contends that it at all times provided electrical 
power in compliance with its tariff filed with the PUC and otherwise 
furnished and maintained adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable 
services and facilities to [plaintiff]. 
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Id. at 556-57.  The controversy between Teleconcepts and Bell is analogous.  We believe 
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required the district court to utilize the 
bifurcated procedure established for resolving questions of liability where damages are 
sought in a matter involving the special expertise of the PUC.  Thus, although the 
district court had jurisdiction over the third-party claim, the court erred in deciding 
the question of liability.  That claim must be transferred to the PUC for such a 
determination. If the PUC concludes that Teleconcepts is entitled to indemnification from 
Bell, the district court may then make an appropriate award to Teleconcepts. 
Image,, 600 A.2d at 557.      
 We are aware that language in some decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
our sister Courts of Appeals seems to suggest a contrary result here. For example, in 
Reiter v. Cooper, 113 S. Ct. 1213 (1993) the Court stated: 
 
Referral of the issue to the administrative agency does not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion to either retain 
jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, 
to dismiss the case without prejudice. 
113 S. Ct. at 1219. See also, U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 83 S. Ct. 1715 (1963) 
(comparing primary jurisdiction to a prudential doctrine of abstention and noting that 
primary jurisdiction merely postpones and does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction 
by a federal court), Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 114 S. Ct. 855 
(1994) (failure to brief primary jurisdiction resulted in waiving consideration of the 
doctrine), Gross v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1955) (the court 
found the parties had waived any consideration of primary jurisdiction and noted, "[i]n 
this respect, primary jurisdiction is quite different from subject matter 
jurisdiction[]"), and U.S. v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 1987) ("the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction, despite what the term may imply, does not speak of the 
jurisdictional power of the federal courts[]").  However, none of these cases addressed 
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the issue of the authority of a federal court to adjudicate a matter that a state 
legislature had placed within the exclusive domain of a state administrative agency. 
Accordingly, our analysis here is consistent with the results reached in such cases. 
U.S. v. Western Pacific Railroad, 77 S. Ct. 161, 165 (1956). There, the court stated:
[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does 'more than prescribe 
the mere procedural timetable of the law suit.  It is a doctrine 
allocating the law making power over certain aspects' of commercial 
relations.  'It transfers from court to agency the power to determine' 
some of the incidents of such relations.  
 
77 S. Ct. at 166 (emphasis added). See also, Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.
577 (1950), and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Day, 79 S. Ct. 1322 (1959), and 
Hotel and Casino, supra.   
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has committed the issues raised by Teleconcepts' 
claim against Bell to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Public Utilities 
Commission and a federal court can not amend state law by exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction. Indeed, a contrary holding would mean that the federal courts are empowered 
to decide matters of state law that courts in the affected state lack authority to 
resolve. Since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that "the Public Utility 
Commission has been vested by the legislature with exclusive original jurisdiction. . ." 
of the issues which this suit requires us to resolve,  Behrend v. Bell Telephone Co.
A.2d 346, 347 (1968), we must remand to the district court for appropriate proceedings. 
 Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Bell and remand so that the district court can transfer the third-party claim to the 
PUC for a determination of liability.  The district court retains jurisdiction over this 
matter pending the liability determination by the PUC.0 
                     
0
      We realize that after the district court disposes of the allocation of long 
distance charges between MCI and Teleconcepts in accordance with this opinion, the court 
will be left with only the third-party claim founded on state law.  It is for the district 
court to decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction at that point, or to dismiss 
the third-party claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).   
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III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgments of the district court, and remand this case to the district court for 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
 
 I join the majority's opinion.0  I write separately, however, because I believe 
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the majority's holding with respect to primary jurisdiction is incorrect and will 
unnecessarily limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Although I agree with the 
majority's decision to apply primary jurisdiction analysis, I do not agree with the manner 
in which it conflates that doctrine with the district court's constitutional and statutory 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Teleconcepts' third-party claim. 
I. 
 The majority, recognizing that neither party below raised the issue, 
nevertheless concludes that "we must . . . determine if the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction applies." Majority typescript at 34 (emphasis added); see id. at 35.  It 
relies for this proposition on Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 
1994), in which we remarked that "when the legislature provides an agency with 'exclusive 
primary jurisdiction,' it preempts the courts' original jurisdiction over the subject 
matter."  Id. at 1230 n.5.  That opinion also stated that we heard the appeal because "we 
are obliged to examine the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court."  
1230 n.4.  Essentially, the majority treats dicta from Greate Bay as a holding that a 
state legislature or court, by virtue of conferring "exclusive" primary jurisdiction on a 
state administrative agency, divests an Article III federal court of its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  That treatment cannot withstand rigorous analysis, and, to the extent the 
majority adopts it,0 I believe it errs. 
A. 
 The majority recognizes that "language in some decisions . . . seems to su
a contrary result here." Majority typescript at 42.  Indeed, a whole host of cases stand 
for the proposition that primary jurisdiction (exclusive or otherwise) has nothing to do 
with subject matter jurisdiction. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, ____, 113 S. Ct. 
1213, 1220 (1993) ("Referral of the issue to the administrative agency does not deprive 
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the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion to either retain jurisdiction or, if the 
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without prejudice."); 
General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 432
325, 331 (1940) (district court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but should 
have stayed its hand pending determination of certain issues by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission); accord Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 114 S. Ct. 855, 863 
n.10 (1994) (primary jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, is waivable); 
Common Carrier, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); 
United States v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (primary 
jurisdiction, despite the name, does not go to the jurisdictional power of the federal 
courts) (citing United States v. Bessemer & L.E. R.R., 717 F.2d 593, 599 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)); Oasis Pet. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 718 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Temp. 
Emer. Ct. App. 1983) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 83 S. 
Ct. 1715 (1963)). 
 The majority acknowledges most of the above cases, but attempts to distinguish 
them on the rationale that none of those cases "addressed the issue of the authority of a 
federal court to adjudicate a matter that a state legislature had placed within the 
exclusive domain of a state administrative agency."  Majority typescript at 43.  This 
distinction, that a state legislature's or court's actions may divest the federal courts 
of subject matter jurisdiction where the same action by Congress would not, is unsupported 
by the cases the majority cites. 
 In the first case relied on by the majority, United States v. Western Pac. R.R. 
Co., 352 U.S. 59, 77 S. Ct. 161 (1956), railroads sued the government in the Court of 
Claims to recover differences between the tariff rates they had been paid and the rates 
they believed were required on shipments of napalm bombs.  The issue was whether the 
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tariff for gasoline in drums or the higher tariff for incendiary bombs applied to the 
shipments. Neither party raised the issue of primary jurisdiction in the lower court, but 
the Supreme Court, on its own motion, considered the question of whether exclusive primary 
jurisdiction was vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission.  Notably, the reason the 
Court gave for considering the issue sua sponte was comity, not subject matter 
jurisdiction: 
Before this Court neither side has questioned the validity of the 
lower court's views [regarding primary jurisdiction]. Nevertheless, 
because we regard the maintenance of a proper relationship between the 
courts and the Commission in matters affecting transportation policy 
to be of continuing public concern, we have been constrained to 
inquire into this aspect of the decision. 
Id. at 63, 77 S. Ct. at 165.  Its doctrinal discussion of primary jurisdiction was 
likewise not cast in jurisdictional terms: 
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting 
proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies 
charged with particular regulatory duties. "Exhaustion" applies where 
a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative 
agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the 
administrative process has run its course. "Primary jurisdiction," on 
the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the 
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires 
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been 
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in 
such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such 
issues to the administrative body for its views.   
 
Id. at 63-64, 77 S. Ct. at 165 (citing General American Tank Car, 308 U.S at 433, 60 S. 
Ct. at 331).0  I therefore conclude that when the Western Pacific Court spoke of 
transferring "the power" to determine the parties' relations from the court to the agency, 
see majority typescript at 43, it was speaking of a jurisprudential deference predicated 
on administrative rulemaking authority, not subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. 
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 Article III of the Constitution defines the outer limits of a federal district 
court's subject matter jurisdiction. By statute, Congress may choose to grant jurisdiction 
short of those limits, for example, by requiring complete rather than minimal diversity, 
or by imposing jurisdictional amounts in diversity cases.  Determining subject matter 
jurisdiction is not a particularly complex task; as the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he 
Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress 
must have supplied it. . . ." Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 
2006 (1989) (quoting The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (1868)). Thus, if Congress 
wishes to confer exclusive jurisdiction on a federal administrative agency and divest the 
district courts of that jurisdiction, it would be within its constitutional power to do 
so, although it has not done so in the cases discussed above. 
 Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may likewise confer exclusive primary 
jurisdiction on a federal court0 or administrative agency and divest the state
what would otherwise be within their subject matter jurisdiction.  This unremarkable 
principle explains the "exclusive" primary jurisdiction of the National Railway Adjustment 
Board found by the Supreme Court in two of the cases the majority relies upon. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 552, 79 S. Ct. 1322, 1325 (1959); 
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 244, 70 S. Ct. 577, 580 (1950).  
 A state legislature may also limit the jurisdiction of its own state courts by 
enacting a statute vesting exclusive primary jurisdiction in a state board or agency, 
subject of course to the confines of state law and the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Greate Bay, 34 F.3d at 1230 & n.5 (dictum); Behrend v. Bell 
Tel. Co., 431 Pa. 63, 243 A.2d 346, 347-48 (1968).  Thus, I have no quarrel with the 




 It does not follow, however, that a state may by statutory or decisional law 
restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.  It is axiomatic that, 
because its subject matter jurisdiction can be conferred or withdrawn only by Congress, a 
federal court must look only to federal, not state, law to determine that jurisdiction 
non, even when the substantive right at issue is a creature of the state.  
Jacoby, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1981); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 
713-16 (4th Cir. 1961).  That a state simply has no power to divest a federal court of its 
congressionally conferred subject matter jurisdiction, has been settled law for nearly a 
century.  See, e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43
S. Ct. 10, 12 (1909); Land Title & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co., 127 F. 1, 19 (3d Cir. 1903) 
(dictum).  Modern caselaw continues in full accord with the early cases.  See
Brown, Inc., 807 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1987); Dominion Nat'l Bank v. Olsen
108, 116 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985); Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 728 F.2d 407, 409 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825, 105 S. Ct. 104 (1984); Mullen v. Academy Life Ins
Co., 705 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 827, 104 S. Ct. 
101 (1983); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing cases); 
Duchek, 646 F.2d at 419 & n.4 (citing cases, quoting Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 286 (1871)); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Lexington State Bank & Trust 
Co., 604 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (8th Cir. 1979); Markham, 292 F.2d at 713-16; In re English 
Seafood (USA) Inc., 743 F. Supp. 281, 285-86 (D. Del. 1990) (Roth, J.) ("a state statute 
that creates a remedy or type of proceeding cannot narrow the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts") (quoting Land Title & Trust, 127 F. at 19-20); Codos v. National Diagnostic 
Corp., 711 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Kanouse v. Westwood Obstetrical & 
Gynecological Assocs., 505 F. Supp. 129, 129 (D.N.J. 1981) (Brotman, J.). 
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 Moreover, this inviolability of federal subject matter jurisdiction applies even 
when the substantive right at issue is created solely by state law and is enf
before a state administrative agency.  See Webb, 807 F.2d at 784 (exclusive remedy before 
state workers' compensation fund); Beach, 728 F.2d 407 (subject matter jurisdiction exists 
even though state law purports to vest exclusive jurisdiction in Industrial Disputes 
Board); Begay, 682 F.2d at 1315-17 (workers' compensation system); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. K.A.T., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 980, 984-85 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (failure to exhaust state 
administrative remedies); Jones v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 440, 441 
(N.D. Ind. 1987) (Industrial Disputes Board). 
 Recent opinions of this court have been somewhat less rigorous and detailed in 
their analysis of subject matter jurisdiction than the caselaw set forth above, but are 
nevertheless in basic accord with it.  In Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 
1979), the issue was "whether a federal court may entertain a Pennsylvania medical 
malpractice claim under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, before the claimant has 
initially taken recourse to the state Arbitration Panels for Health Care. . . ."  
132.  Such recourse was "a condition precedent to entry into the state judicial system." 
Id. at 134.  In the two cases consolidated on appeal, "the district courts held that 
although claimants made the necessary averments for subject matter jurisdiction in the 
federal courts, exercise of diversity jurisdiction would be improper until the claims were 
arbitrated under the state arbitration procedure." Id. at 133 (emphasis added, foo
omitted).  We affirmed, notwithstanding the ruling of one of the district courts that the 
Pennsylvania arbitration panel had exclusive primary jurisdiction.  Id.   
 In the later case of Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1980), a state 
prisoner sued prison doctors for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  
As a pendent claim under the doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. 
47 
Ct. 1130 (1966), he also brought a claim for malpractice, but without submitting i
Pennsylvania malpractice arbitration panel.  Id. at 1205-06.  In the concluding paragraph 
of our opinion, we did state that "the district court was without subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Hamilton's related medical malpractice claim."  624 F.2
This statement was not a part of the holding, but was at most an unguarded choice of 
words, because earlier in the opinion we stated: 
There is no question that we have power under Gibbs to consider this 
claim.  But Gibbs also requires that the federal court determine 
pendent claims in accordance with the applicable state law.  Here, the 
applicable state law requires that a malpractice claim be submitted to 
arbitration before being considered in court.  Thus, while a federal 
court has the power under the Gibbs test of pendent jurisdiction to 
hear a malpractice claim, it may exercise this power only after the 
claim has been submitted to arbitration. We have so held first in 
Edelson and now here. 
Id. at 1210 n.6. 
 Taken together in the light of the abundant caselaw reviewed above, 
Hamilton teach that, while the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Teleconcepts third-party claim, it should have refrained from exercising it pending a 
decision in the proceedings before the PUC.  See Cheyney State College Faculty v. 
Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 736 (3d Cir. 1983) (likening primary jurisdiction to abstention) 
(quoting Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 353, 83 S. Ct. at 1736).  This is so, not 
because the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the PUC deprived the district court of the 
subject matter jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution and Congress, but because 
the PUC's exclusive primary jurisdiction is part of the substantive law of Pennsylvania, 
law which we are bound to apply under the Erie doctrine.0  See Edelson, 610 F.2d at 135.
 Many courts have followed this approach, refraining from exercising jurisdiction 
pending completion of appropriate administrative proceedings.  In Webb, for example, the 
court opined that, rather than dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
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[i]t is more accurate to characterize the reason for the dismissal of 
the complaint as the court's belief that the complaint, as a matter of 
law, did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted because 
the exclusive remedy provision of [the state workers' compensation 
statute] barred a common law negligence claim." 
807 F.2d at 784-85.  Likewise, in Beach, the court opined: 
 Despite our ruling that the district court had jurisdiction to 
entertain this suit, we affirm the entry of summary judgment because 
Indiana has eliminated the cause of action asserted by the plaintiffs.  
The Indiana law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between 
employees and their employers in the disputes board operates to close 
state court doors to the plaintiffs. The state's denial of a judicial 
remedy in this case is a denial of the substantive right asserted by 
the plaintiffs.  An employee or his representatives or kin may make no 
claim other than before the Industrial Disputes Board.  Accordingly, 
the state courts have no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, and 
the plaintiffs therefore have no claim to press in this federal 
action, which depends entirely upon state law. 
728 F.2d at 409 (citing Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 
1237 (1949); Begay, 682 F.2d at 1316-19).  Accord Begay, 682 F.2d at 1316-19 (case 
dismissed for failure to state any claim upon which the state court could grant relief); 
Markham, 292 F.2d at 717-18 ("Erie doctrine does not extend to matters of jurisdiction"; 
Erie held not to require nonexercise of jurisdiction under circumstances of case); 
664 F. Supp. at 447 (case dismissed for failure to state a claim when relief could be 
obtained only from state industrial board); Kanouse, 505 F. Supp. at 132 (deferring 
exercise of jurisdiction pending completion of medical malpractice panel review).
D. 
 That brings me to the scope of the holding of Greate Bay, because if 
holds as the majority believes it does, our Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 compels us to 
follow it, regardless of whether I consider it jurisprudentially sound. In that case, a 
casino sued a gambler to enforce a settlement agreement concerning his gaming losses.  The 
gambler counterclaimed, alleging that the casino allowed him to gamble although it knew he 
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was intoxicated.  On the counterclaim, the jury found for the casino, and the gambler 
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.  He then appealed that ruling, and t
casino cross-appealed, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction because 
exclusive jurisdiction to order restitution was vested with the Casino Control Commission 
and that, therefore, "the district court should not have exercised jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim."  34 F.3d at 1230 (emphases added). 
 We affirmed the denial of the new trial.  Id. at 1235-37.  The Greate Bay
stated in a footnote that it was "obliged to examine the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the district court," id. at 1230 n.4, and it engaged in a detailed analysis of exclusive 
primary jurisdiction, holding that jurisdiction was not exclusive.  Id. at 1235.  Based on 
that determination, the panel did not need to, and indeed did not, engage in an analysis 
of the effect that a finding of exclusive primary jurisdiction would have on the district 
court's power to grant restitution or even to hear the case.  Once the court determined 
that the Commission did not have exclusive primary jurisdiction, it determined that the
motion for new trial was properly denied by the district court. 
 I therefore conclude that footnote 4 of Greate Bay, which speaks in terms of the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction, is dictum and should not be followed here.
To the extent the majority relies on it for its holding, it places more weight on 
Bay than it will bear, placing Greate Bay in conflict with our opinions in 
Hamilton, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Reiter and the cases discussed 
  E. 
 In sum, I conclude that, although the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over Teleconcepts' third-party claim, the exclusive primary jurisdiction of 
the PUC is part of the substantive law of Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, to the extent that a 
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Pennsylvania state court is unable to grant relief at this time, an Erie-bound federal 
court likewise may not ordinarily grant it. 
II. 
A. 
 I use "ordinarily" to refer to the posture in which this type of case usually 
comes before a district court--the situation in which one or more of the parties raises 
the issue of exclusive primary jurisdiction as a bar to relief in the federal forum.  In 
such a case, the court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction pending completion 
of proceedings before the administrative agency.  This case, however, is different because 
exclusive primary jurisdiction was not litigated in the district court.  
 If exclusive primary jurisdiction did divest the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, the majority would be undeniably correct in reaching the issue sua sponte 
for the first time on appeal.  As I have already shown, subject matter jurisdiction is not 
implicated; thus, we would not normally reach the issue at this stage of the proceedings.
B. 
 In primary jurisdiction cases, however, we have discretion to consider on our 
own motion whether that doctrine applies.  See Northwest Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 863 n.10; 
Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 63, 77 S. Ct. at 165.  In Western Pacific, the Supreme Court 
reached that issue because of the public concern over the proper relationship between the 
courts and the ICC.  352 U.S. at 63, 77 S. Ct. at 165.  There, the courts' interpretations 
of public tariffs had the potential to differ significantly from those of the agency 
charged with their regulation, with the potential of causing uncertainty and resulting in 
harm to either shippers or railroads.  On the other hand, in Northwest Airlines
which the Court did not consider the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, at issue were the 
rates a county airport authority charged airlines. 
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 This case, like Western Pacific, involves public tariffs, which appears to weigh 
in favor of the majority's decision to examine the primary jurisdiction issue.  
Discretion, of course, is exactly that--a choice of decisions, not a rule of law
should not be inferred that every case involving a tariff requires the same result.  In 
this case, however, I agree with the majority's decision to reach the issue of exclusive 
primary jurisdiction (though not with its jurisdictional rationale).0 
2 I therefore concur in part, and concur in the judgment. 
